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 Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of 
Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based 
VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an 
auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the 
highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud 
Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid 
values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result 
of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed an auction 
scheme to select the winner without revealing the individual bid values to the 
auctioneer to maintain privacy of bid values. The winner will get the access 
to the bundle of VM instances. This scheme relies on a set of cryptographic 
protocols including Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol to 
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1. INTRODUCTION (10 PT) 
Cloud Computing Environment(CCE) enables the cloud users to deploy their applications in cloud 
via Internet on demand[1]. Cloud is a type of distributed and parallel system comprising of a collection of 
interconnected and virtualized computers which are dynamically provisioned and presented as one or more 
unified computing resources based on Service Level Agreement(SLA) [2][3] using pay per use model. At the 
same time, Cloud Service Provider get benefit due to commercialization of huge computing resources 
through cloud platform. SLA is a legal contract between CSP and cloud user to achieve Quality of 
Service(QoS) [3]. A virtualization environment enables the service provision by creating Virtual Machine 
instances which has become the essential technology of Cloud Computing Environments[4]. Virtual 
Machines are the software implementation of the computing environment where an OS or a program may be 
installed and run. Currently fixed-price allocation mechanism is used by most of the CSPs to allocate Virtual 
Machine instances to their user. Cloud Computing Environment offers IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), 
PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service) on the basis of subscription that helps 
different organizations in decreasing operational expenses. In fixed price mechanism, cloud user who values 
the VM instances more may or may not get access to it. Hence it is not economically efficient[5]. Also fixed 
price allocation mechanisms may lead to generate revenue which is less than optimal revenue for CSP[5]. 
This problem can be addressed by using auction based VM instances allocation mechanism. Security is the 
major concern in cloud[6] and privacy preservation is required to achieve the integrity of data[15]. In this 
paper, we proposed a privacy preserving auction based VM instances allocation scheme run by CSP which 
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will help in selecting the winner of the auction without seeing the individual bid values of participants of the 
auction i.e, cloud users. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the existing pricing schemes in CCE. Section 
3 proposes a privacy preserving auction scheme for VM instances allocation. Section 4 discusses the 
experimental result analysis. Lastly section 5 concludes the work along with its future scope. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
Through Cloud Computing Environment(CCE), individual and small to large organizations can 
fulfil their computational requirements with minimum cost. It is becoming critical for the several Cloud 
Service Providers(CSP) to determine appropriate price for users. There exist many pricing schemes for Cloud 
Service Providers which are broadly classified into fixed and dynamic pricing scheme. 
CCE provides the required computational needs of the cloud user in terms of Virtual Machines(VM) 
in pay per use basis. In current scenario, the majority of Cloud Service Provider fix their price based on the 
size of VM instances. Fixed pricing scheme is one of the widely used technique in CCE. In fixed price 
mechanism, VM instances are allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis to the users till the resources are 
exhausted[7].Use of fixed price scheme may tend to lower the revenue generation for the CSP as the cloud 
user pay less for using the same resources for a long period. So to address the problem of high revenue 
generation for CSP, auction based pricing scheme is used. 
In dynamic pricing scheme, final service price is decided dynamically through auctions. Auction 
based pricing scheme follows dynamic pricing policy where a target service price is achieved resulting from 
dynamic supply and demand through auction. 
Combinatorial auction in CCE allows the user to buy a bundle of VM instances through auction 
which is profitable to both the buyer and seller. For the entire bundle, bid is submitted as a single unit. 
Zaman and Grosu [7] proposed a combinatorial auction mechanism which allows the cloud users to 
bid for a subset of a VM instances (bundle). Cloud Service Provider being the auctioneer selects the winner 
having the highest bid value for that particular bundle of VM instances. In their work, they have proposed 
CA-GREEDY and CA-LP mechanism to perform combinatorial auction. They analysed the pros and cons of 
the proposed mechanisms and provided the guidelines for its implementation. 
Prasad et al. [8] presented a procurement auction as a solution of resource allocation problem in 
cloud. In their proposed auction scheme they have introduced the concept of auction broker which will run 
the auction mechanism instead of Cloud Service Provider. As a result of which cloud users will contact 
auction broker for their resource requirements and different Cloud Service Providers will participate in the 
auction run by the broker for the resource allocation. Their proposed auction scheme was based on 
Combinatorial Auction Branch on Bids(CABOB) model and supports multiple resource selection 
by cloud user. 
Garg et al. [9] proposed a double auction mechanism that involves both buyer and seller to submit 
their bids to the auctioneer. The auctioneer takes the help of meta scheduler to sort the bids in ascending and 
descending order and look for a match. If match found, the average of the values is set as the auction price 
for the resource. The same process continued for the unmatched request. Both seller and buyer are benefitted 
in this auction mechanism. 
Zaman and Grosu [10] proposed CA-PROVISION mechanism to address the dynamic provisioning 
of VM instances to generate more profit for cloud which is not considered in their previous work[7].Through 
extensive experiments they have proved that in case of low demand, CA-PROVISION generates higher 
revenue than CA-GREEDY. 
Amazon EC2 uses an auction called as Amazon spot instances [11] where the users bid for the 
unused virtual machines. User having higher price than spot price which is set based on data centre utilization 
by the Amazon will get the access to that VM instances. 
Choi and Lim [12] discussed the importance of SLA violation cost to increase Cloud Service 
Provider's profit. They proposed a scheme to reduce the penalty cost for SLA violation during combinatorial 
Auction considering urgency of jobs. They calculated probability of each job's deadline violation to find 
expected profit value for the service provider to select the user with largest expected value as the bid winner. 
Thus decreasing SLA violation leads to decrease penalty cost which in turn increases service 
provider's profit.  
 
 
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Cloud user can choose a wide range of VM instances based on the performance he/she wants. 
Deployment of more VM instances or replacing the existing VM instances with powerful VM instances can 
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increase the performance of the application. Hence to get better performance, cloud user can opt to get 
appropriate VM instances. In existing auction mechanisms, auctioneer knows the bid values. It may lead to 
loss of privacy and integrity of bid values to win the auction or to gain more profit. Hence to prevent such 
kind of activities, we have proposed an auction scheme that allows the user to participate in a privacy 
preserving auction to get the best VM instances without revealing their bid values to the auctioneer (CSP. 
The VM instances are assigned to the cloud user with highest bid value. Hence, generating higher revenue for 
the Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The auction-based VM instances allocation scheme is run by the CSP. 
Like other secure computation, the proposed auction scheme can determine the winner of the auction using 
secure multiparty computation which relies on a set of cryptographic protocols including Oblivious Transfer 
(OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol using RSA algorithm. 
 
3.1.  Yao’s Protocol 
Secure multi-party computation allows multiple parties each having a secret input to compute a 
function while ensuring no party will reveal the inputs to each other or to a trusted third party. The 
computation result will be communicated to all parties. However, a given party will only be able to compute 
what can be inferred from the final results and its own input. In [13] Yao introduce the problem of computing 
the maximum with the following problem: Two millionaires want to compare their riches, but do not want to 
reveal to each other which is the exact amount of their wealth. 
 
3.2.  Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol 
Oblivious Transfer protocol [14] is central to implement Yao's protocol. OT1
2
, 1-out-of-2 oblivious 
transfer ensures that one party can obtain one of the two messages from a second party and both the parties 
could not know which values are selected by each other. OT1
k
,1-out-of-k oblivious transfer, is the 
functionality: OT1
k((σ1, σ2,..., σk ),i) = (λ, σi) where σ1, σ2,..., σk ϵ { 0,1} and i ϵ { 1,....,k }.Here, the first party 
(Alice) has k secret bits σ1, σ2,..., σk. Bob has a secret index i. At the end of the protocol, Bob learns only σi 
and Alice learns nothing (λ). In particular, Alice does not know which of her bits was learned by Bob, and 




4. THE PROPOSED PRIVACY PRESERVING AUCTION SCHEME 
The system model of the proposed scheme, which includes 'n' organizations (Cloud User1, Cloud 
User2..., Cloud Usern) and a Cloud Service Provider is illustrated in Figure1. The public key (data encryption) 
and private key (data decryption) are managed by the Cloud Service Provider to perform privacy-preserving 




Figure 1. System model of the proposed privacy preserving auction scheme 
 
 
All participants of this scheme work in a semi-honest environment, where they may try to deduce 
additional information during the protocol execution. The workflow of the proposed scheme is summarized 
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Table 1. Workflow of the proposed system 
Step 1-Key Generation Algorithm used by CSP 
1.1       Choose p and q: two distinct prime numbers 
1.2 Compute N = p×q, Where N is used as the modulus for public and private keys 
1.3 Compute Φ (N) = (p-1)×(q-1), Where Φ is the Eulier function 
1.4 Choose encryption key which is an integer 'e' such that, 1 < e < Φ (N) and greatest common 
divisor of (e, Φ (N)) = 1 
1.5 Determine the decryption key d =( 1/e) mod Φ (N) 
1.6 All the above values of public key(e,N=p×q) and private key(d) must be kept secret by CSP 
Step 2- Collection of request from participants and preparation of list by CSP 
2.1 for j = 1, . . . , n do 
2.2 Receive (rj1, . . . , r
j
m ) from user uj 
2.3 end for 
2.4 Sort users according to their time of placing the request, from earliest to latest 
(Here we assume u1, u2, . . . , un as the order.) 
Step 3- Winner selection by the Cloud Service Provider 
3.1 Let us assume first and second participant in this protocol are denoted by Alice and Bob 
respectively 
3.2 CSP will send e,N to Bob and N to Alice 
3.3 Bob picks random integer 'X' of N bit and calculate C = Xe mod N 
3.4 Bob calculates C- It + 1, where It is the sensitive data of Bob and send it to CSP 
3.5 CSP will generate Y1,Y2,Y3......,Y10 such that Y1 is the decipherment of C- It +1, Y2 is the 
decipherment of C- It +2 and so on. using the formula : 
Y1= (C- It +1)
d mod N ,Y2= (C- It +2)
d mod N...Y10= (C- It +10)
d mod N 
3.6 CSP sends Y1,...Y10 to Alice 
3.7 Alice generates a prime number P which is N/2 bit and │Zi-Zj│≥ 2 for i≠j and calculates 
Zi=Yi mod P where i,j ∈ [1..10] 
3.8 Alice adds 1 to Zi values for all i >Ik where Ik is the secret value of Alice 
3.9 Alice sends P, Z values to CSP 
3.10 CSP sends P, Z values to Bob 
3.11 Bob calculates G= X mod P and checks 
If (Zn ≡ G mod P) 
Set W= 0  
Else 
Set W= 1 
3.12 Bob sends W to CSP 
3.13 CSP checks 
 if( W==0) 
 Alice is the winner 
 else  
 Bob is the winner 
3.14 The same process will be repeated for the winner and next participant till n number of user 
to determine the winner of the Auction 
Step 4- VM instance allocation 
4.1 Winner pays the CSP 
4.2 CSP will assign VM instances to the winner  
 
 
5.  RESULT ANALYSIS  
In this section, we focus on evaluating the performance of one of the existing auction scheme and 
the proposed auction scheme in terms of execution time. The technical specification of CPU, OS and RAM 
considered for our experimental setup are as follows: CPU: Intel Core i5 2.7GHz, OS: Ubuntu, RAM: 8GB. 
In our experiment,we have increased the number of participants(Cloud Users) from 2,4,8 to 16 and recorded 
corresponding execution times in milli seconds(ms) to select the winner using CA-GREEDY algorithm[7] 
and our proposed privacy preserving auction scheme which are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively. 
As shown in Figure 2, CA-GREEDYalgorithm takes 58ms for two users, 62ms for four users, 65ms for eight 
users, 66ms for 16 users to select the winner of the auction. As shown in Figure 3, the proposed auction 
scheme takes 995ms for two users, 1582ms for four users, 2946ms for eight users, 5638ms for 16 users to 
select the winner of the auction. 
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Figure 3. Execution Time vs. No. of participants for the proposed auction scheme 
 
 
The result obtained shows that the execution time of our proposed auction scheme increases by 
1.17% than the existing CA-GREEDY algorithm [7] by considering the privacy issues of bid values which is 
missing in CA-GREEDYalgorithm. However, the computing ability of CSP is much more than our 
simulation PC to carry out these auction mechanisms. Hence the computation time will be comparatively less 
than ours in real CCE. Hence, this algorithm can be used as a privacy preserving auction scheme to achieve 




In this paper, we presented one scheme to facilitate privacy preserving auction for VM instances 
allocation where all participants follow the protocol and nothing can be inferred from one's input and output. 
This proposed scheme can be used to generate higher revenue for CSP without disclosing the bid values of 
different users participated in the auction to the auctioneer (CSP). Our proposed auction scheme work in the 
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